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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
)

JAY A. LEMBACH,

)

Plaintiff/Appellant,

v.
BARBARA A. COX,

)
)
)
)
)
)

No. 17095

)

Defendant/Respondent.

-------------------

)
)
)

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
NATURE OF THE CASE
This is a custody dispute between ,the natural
father and natural mother of a child born out of wedlock.
DISPOSITION OF THE CASE IN
THE TRIAL COURT
This matter was tried to the Third District Court,
Honorable Kenneth Rigtrup presiding.
custody to the Defendant.

The Court awarded

Plaintiff made a variety of post

trial motions which resulted in an Amended Judgment (R.
175), still awarding custody of the child to Defendant.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondent seeks affirmance of the District Court's
Amended Judgment.
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STATEMENT OF FACTS
Respondent adopts the facts as set out in Appellant's
Brief with the following exceptions:
As to the care of the child the trial court found
that Defendant had primary responsibility for
the care of the child between August 15, 1978 and
June 6, 19 7 9 ( R. 172) .
Dr. Cooper testified that joint custody working
successfully depends on the willingness of the
parties to work out such an arrangement (R. 246)
and that joint custody should not be ordered by
the court over the objection of the parents
(R. 252, 263). Dr. Cooper further testified
that it was unlikely that these two parents
could negotiate for Thaddeus' care (R. 255).
Dr. Schneiman testified that there were no substantial differences in nurturing or parenting
skills between the parties (R. 283-4).
Both Dr. Cooper (R. 256-7) and Dr. Schneirnan
(R. 286-7) testified that custody should be
decided on the totality of factors not giving
particular weight to economic resources.
The trial court awarded custody to Defendant,
finding that the best interest of the child would
be so served (R. 173).
ARGUMENT
I.
THE TRIAL COURT BASED ITS DECISION UPON THE
BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD AND THE DECISION
IS SUPPORTED BY AMPLE EVIDENCE IN THE RECORD.
This Court has established a stringent standard of
review in cases concerning child custody awards.

In the

case of Jorgensen v. Jorgensen, 599 P.2d 510, 511-512 (Utah
1979) the court explained:
A determination of the "best interests
of the child" frequently turns on
numerous factors which the trial court is
best suited to assess, given its proximity
to the parties and the circumstances.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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Only where the trial court action is so
flagrantly unjust as to constitute an abuse
of discretion should the appellate forum
interpose its own judgment.
In the present case, the record shows that the
determination by the trial court granting custody to the
Defendant was based on ample evidence that such an award
would best serve the interests of Thaddeus, the one and onehalf year old son of the parties, and should be upheld.
The clearest basis for the court's award was the
difference in care furnished the child by the parties. From
the time that Thaddeus.was born, the Defendant has assumed
the primary responsibility in caring for him.

While the

Defendant was living with the Plaintiff, she nursed the
child (R. 327), took care of his medical needs (R. 330),
took the child to work with her during the day (R. 327), and
even joined with him in swinuning classes (R. 329).

At

night, when the Plaintiff was at home he and the Defendant
shared child care responsibility (R. 327).

However, the

primary obligation to care for Thaddeus was always assumed
by the Defendant.
The Defendant testified at trial that, if awarded
custody, she would continue to care for Thaddeus personally,
rather than placing him in day c·are (R. 336, 337).
Conversely, there is much evidence which shows
that the Plaintiff has been unwilling or unable practically
to spend as much time with Thaddeus.
Plaintiff and Defendant separated.

-3-

In June of 1979, the
It was agreed that
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Thaddeus would spend June and July with the Defendant and
August with the Plaintiff.

During August, while in his

father's custody, Thaddeus spent most of his days in day
care

{R. 318).

During January and February 1980, the

parties stipulated that Plaintiff would have sole custody of
Thaddeus for approximately two weeks.

The Plaintiff testified

at trial that during that two week period, Thaddeus was
again placed in day care during the daytime {R. 319).
Further, there is nothing in the record which would indicate
that the Plaintiff would not similarly place Thaddeus in day
care if given custody of the boy {R. 241) .
Clearly, a single parent often is forced to choose
between full time employment outside of the home and personally
caring for his or her child during the day.
not an easy one.

The choice is

It is understandable that the Plaintiff,

if given custody, would be forced to place Thaddeus in day
care as long as he continued at his present employment.
However, for a child as young as Thaddeus, the trade-off
between the Plaintiff's earning power and the Defendant's
willingness to be a full-time parent is best resolved in
favor of the party who will care for the child at home.

The

Washington Supreme Court was faced with a similar issue in
In re Guardianship of Palmer, 81 Wash. 2d 604, 503 P.2d 464
(1972).

The court stated that the issue of the relative

wealth of the parties was immaterial and that the significant
focus was on which party could provide the child with the
greatest degree of affection and discriminating care.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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In

the present case, the Defendant is that person and the
Court, correctly recognizing this, awarded her custody.
The Plaintiff makes much of his superior financial
capability and states that the trial court judge ignored
such considerations in making his decision.

The record,

however, indicates that the trial court did not refuse to
consider the relative wealth of the parties (R. 367, 380,
381).

He merely refused to weigh this consideration as

heavily as the Plaintiff would have desired.

He weighed

this factor as one among many, as both expert witnesses
suggested.

In light of Thaddeus' young age, the Defendant's

testimony that her parents were willing to provide some
financial support (R. 341) and her

testi~ony

that she would

seek part-time evening employment in Connecticut (R. 337),
the judge's determination that the isolated issue of relative
finances had no bearing on the issue of parental fitness

(R.

311) was not unreasonable.
Utah case law does not support the Plaintiff's
contention that money in and of itself is a sufficient basis
upon which to award custody.

The Plaintiff cites Jorgensen

v. Jorgensen, supra, for the proposition that money is a
central issue in a child custody case.

But the Plaintiff

ignores that in Jorgensen, the trial court based its decision
on other factors in addition to the father's relative wealth.
This court emphasized that the mother had indiscreetly
engaged in two extramarital sexual relationships with different
-5-
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men, that the child was older, and that, as stated by Chief
Justice Crockett, there were "special circumstances ... which ... the
Court's decision advisedly omitted from fuller exposition."
599 P.2d at 512.

In the present case there were no such

extenuating circumstances.

Standing alone, the Plaintiff's

superior income is not controlling and is only one factor of
many that the trial court evaluated.
Similarly in the recent case of Nielson v. Nielson,
(Utah Sup. Ct. filed October 29, 1980), this court considered
relative

finarj:~.ial

situations of the parties only an "additional

factor" and considered this only in light of the special
circumstances in that case.
Appellant claims that the trial court improperly
applied three legal standards, Appellant's Brief at 12;
however, only one of these is in fact a legal standard - the
tender years presumption which is explored in Point II
below.

Appellant maintains that the trial court abused his

discretion by considering evidence of the Plaintiff's
insensitivity to the Defendant and his refusal to marry her
so as to allow Thaddeus the advantages of being born in
wedlock.

However, the record does not indicate that the

judge's consideration of such evidence imposed a "greater
burden upon the natural father of the child than upon the
child's natural mother" as the Plaintiff asserts.
Such evidence was considered as a basis upon which

.
to assess the Plaintiff's character and was indicative of
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the Plaintiff's unwillingness to make sacrifices for Thaddeus
as compared to the Defendant's (R. 361).

The consideration

was not gender based and could have been applied just as
easily to a natural mother who was unwilling to legitimate a
child through marriage.
Appellant makes much of the trial court's discussion
of the illegitimate status of the child.

However this

discussion in no way interfered with the correct legal
standard that the court applied - the best interests test
(R. 173).

In fact the trial court recognized and applied

this test which was consistent with Judge Durham's pre-trial
order on this issue (R. 88).

Since the correct standard was

used, the focus on certain attitudes and behaviors of either
party which the court chose to focus on are within the sound
discretion of the trial court.
Finally, the trial court did ·not abuse its discretion
in refusing to award both parties joint custody of Thaddeus.
Joint custody, or any other custody arrangement,
is within the broad equitable powers of the trial court in
custody proceedings.

While this court has never specifically

discussed the standards to be applied in determining whether
joint custody is appropriate, the court has approved a
variety of custodial arrangements which display some variation
from the traditional single custody award.
v.

See e.g. Sampsell

Holt, 202 P.2d 550 (Utah 1949).
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While the experts are divided on the general issue
of joint custody and its effects on children, there seems to
be agreement that this arrangement is not appropriate for
parents who cannot cooperate with each other.

See Dodd

y_:_ Dodd, 93 Misc.2d 641, 403 N.Y.S.2d 401 (Sup. Ct. 1978),

and generally, Joint Custody:

An Alternative for Divorced

Parents, 26 U.C.L.A.L.R. 1084 (1979) at 1110-11.
Testimony from both experts here, Drs. Cooper and
Schneiman, was that joint custody, while an ideal, was
unlikely to work in the present circumstances (R. 247-8,
286).

The Defendant testified she planned to live in Connecticut

to be with her family.

In his testimony, Dr. Schneiman

explained that where the mother and father lived a great
distance apart it would be difficult to arrange for a division
of time where the child spent relatively short visitation
periods with each parent.

According to Dr. Schneiman, such

short alternating custody periods are necessary to provide a
young child with the necessary degree of consistency and
predictability in his environment (R. 278).
Here Appellant and Respondent live at opposite
ends of the United States making communication expensive and
difficult and joint decision-making near impossible.

This

geographic situation, as well as the difficulties encountered
by the parties prior to and during the temporary courtordered joint custody period (R. 285, 305, 317, 335-6)
indicate that joint custody is not appropriate here.
-8Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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Cer-

tainly, this court could, as Appellant seeks, set out appropriate
standards to use in resolving joint custody disputes in this
case; however, any such standards must include the court's
appraisal of the ability of the two parents to work together
which both the experts and the trial court here considered
and found lacking.
While joint custody may be desirable in certain
circumstances, its application in the present case would not
be in the best interest of Thaddeus, and the trial court so
found.
II.
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY APPLIED THE TENDER
YEARS PRESUMPTION AS AN ALTERNATE BASIS FOR
ITS CUSTODY AWARD.
This court has had a number of occasions in recent
years to discuss the tender years presumption and its application in resolving child custody disputes in Utah.

While the

presumption was once traced to U.C.A. §30-3-10, the 1977
amendments to that section removed any such presumption.
Previous cases had split on the issue of whether that section
applied only to separations or to divorce cases as well.

It

is now clear that there is no "statutory" tender years
presumption.

Smith v. Smith, 564 P.2d 307 (Utah 1977);

Jorgensen v. Jorgensen, supra.

There remains however the

"invariably declared policy stated in our decisions ... that
'all things else being equal, preference should be given to
..

the mother in awarding custody of children of tender years'

....

II

Smith v. Smith, supra.
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The problem has arisen in reconciling the "best
interests" test with the "tender years presumption."

The

clearest analysis seems to be that "the presumption is subordinate to the higher rule that the paramount concern in
such cases is the best interest and welfare of the child."
(emphasis added).
1978) .

Bingham v. Bingham, 575 P.2d 703 (Utah

The best interest standard has also been ref erred to

as "the controlling factor,"

Henderson v. Henderson, 576

P.2d 1289 (Utah 1978), or the "primary consideration,"
Jorgensen v. Jorgensen, supra.

In each of these cases the

court found that the best interest test predominated over
the presumption.

In both Jorgensen and Henderson, the

appellant mother sought to have the court overturn a custody
award to the children's father.

Both cases were affirmed,

this court stating that the trial court's findings that the
evidence predominated ia favor of the father and thus he was
awarded custody were based on the best interest test, rather
than some sort of automatic award to the mother under the
guise of the tender years presumption.
As discussed previously, the evidence in the
present case supports the trial court's finding that the
best interest of the child are served by awarding custody to
the mother (R. 257-8).
"best interest"

te~;t

But assuming arguendo, that the

alone does not preponderate in favor of

the Defendant, at the least the evidence shows that the
parties would make equally good.parents and the tender years
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presumption was properly applied as a separate and alternative
basis for the custody award (R. 173 paragraph 2).
The trial court found that the Defendant and the
Plaintiff were equally fit

(R. 367), and that both parents

love the child equally (R. 360) .

Such a finding was supported

by the testimony of Dr. Cooper and of Dr. Schneirnan.

The

parties were found to have similar parenting skills by both
experts (R. 245, 268).
A determination that "all things are equal" does
not require that all things be the same.
m~kes

That the Plaintiff

more money than the Defendant does not necessarily

mean that circumstances preponderate in favor of him, since
other factors may well balance this fact.

The Defendant's

willingness to personally care for Thaddeus and to be at
home with him during the day should be given great weight.
It is such a willingness to personally nurture and care for
a child which is at the heart of a tender years presumption
in

f~ivor

of a mother.

This idea is aptly expressed in State

v. Watts, 350 N.Y.S.2d 285, 289, 77 Misc. 2d. 1.78 (1973):
The rule giving the mother preferential right to custody is considerably
softened by the realization that 'all
things never are exactly equal' and
it is predicated upon the acts of
motherhood ~ not the fact of motherhood. Likewise, the rule will yield
if the welfare of the child demands
it, because this is not a presumption
of law but a simple fact of life
gleaned from human experience, and the
courts are not timid in entrusting
children into their f qthers care and
custody when their best interests will
be served thereby.
(citations omitted
and emphasis added)
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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Utah courts have applied a similar rationale to
the tender years presumption.

In Cox v. Cox,

532 P.2d 994,

996 (Utah 1975) this Court noted that
there is wisdom in the traditional
patterns of thought that the roles
of mother and father are such that all
other things being comparatively equal,
the children should be in the care of
their mothers, especially so children
of younger years.
(emphasis added)
When viewed in light of the evidence, the maternal
preference in the present case operated as a function or
role-based distinction, not a gender-based distinction.

And

the presumption, if applied at all by the trial court, did
not result in a decision which was contrary to the best
interests of Thaddeus.
III.
APPLICATION OF THE TENDER YEARS PRESUMPTION ACCORDING TO UTAH CASE LAW IS
VALID UNDER THE DUE PROCESS AND EQUAL PROTECTION
CLAUSES OF THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION.
In the case of Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645
(1972), the United States Supreme Court held that an Illinois
statute containing an irrebuttable presumption that unmarried
fathers are incompetent to raise their children violated the
due process clause.

The Court found that due process required

a more individualized determination.

In U.S. Department of

Agriculture v. Murry, 413 U.S. 508 (1973), Justice Marshall's
concurring opinion explained:
The Due Process clause requires the
government to act on an individualized
basis, with general propositions serving
-12Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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only as rebuttable presumptions or
other burden shifting devices. That I
think is the import of Stanley v.
Illinois.
The maternal preference, as applied in t11e present
case and as articulated in Jorgensen v. Jorgensen, supra, is
easily distinguished from the constitutionally invalid
Illinois law.

The Illinois procedure prevented any inquiry

into the parental fitness of an unmarried father.

Conversely,

the maternal presumption in Utah is a rebuttable one which
is only triggered when other £actors indicate that both the
mother's and the father's fitness are comparatively equal.
The best interest of the child is always the controlling
test.

Bingham v. Bingham, supra.

The father, married or

unmarried, is always permitted to show any circumstances
which would preponderate in his favor.
In the present case, a full inquiry was made by
the trial court into the

compa~~tive

fitness of both parties.

The court engaged in the individualized determination which
is required by Stanley and described in the Department of
Agriculture case.
In Caban v. Mohanuned, 441 U.S. 380 (1979), the
U.S. Supreme Court reviewed a statutory provision whereby an
unwed mother was permitted to block the adoption of her
child, while the unwed father had no such right.

Gender-

based distinctions, the court held, must serve governmental
objectives and must be substantially related to the achievement
of those objectives to be valid under the Fourteenth Amendment
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Equal Protection Clause.

In Caban the classification was

unable to withstand judicial scrutiny because it was not
substantially related to the State's interest in facilitating
the adoption of illegitimate children.
As discussed in Cox v. Cox, supra, Utah's maternal
preference is not based on a gender based distinction as
much as a role-based distinction.

Certainly, a state has a

valid interest in providing children with a parent who will
best fulfill the nurturing "mother" function.

Where this

role would not be served best by the natural mother, the
court's review of the child's best interest would most
likely result in a custody award in favor of the father.
When a court has considered in depth the relative
fitness of the parties and both are equally loving, competent
parents, it is not unreasonable for a court to rely on the
tender years presumption as a basis for its decision,
especially where the woman is willing to fulfill the "mother
function" on a fulltime basis, since it is the state's
interest in providing children with such a parent which is
at the core of the maternal preference.

When applied in

such a way, the presumption meets the standard announced by
the U.S. Supreme Court in Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971),
that "a classification must be reasonable ... so that all
persons similarly circumstanced shall be treated alike."
Appellant relies on Arnold v. Arnold, 604 P.2d 109
(Nev. 1979), to undercut the continued validity of the

-14Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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tender years presumption.

But the analysis of Arnold is

nearly identical to this Court's language in Bingham,
Henderson and Jorgensen discussed above.

The Nevada court

stated that the "touchstone of all custody determinations is
the best interests of the child," 604 P.2d at 110.

The

court held that custody to the father was in the child's
best interest and rejected the mother's appeal.

This cour·t

has applied an almost identical analysis but has not totally
discredited the presumption.

However, as applied in Utah

and demonstrated in this case, no due process or equal
protection problem arises.
IV.
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DENIED APPELLANT'S
MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL.
Appellant's Motion for a New Trial was denied by
the trial court.

The case law in Utah is clear that the

granting of a U.R.Civ.P. Rule 59 Motion is within the sound
discretion of the trial court and that this ruling should
not be overturned unless it "clearly transgressed any reasonable
bounds of discretion."
P.2d 736, 738

Hyland v. St. Marks Hospital, 427

(Utah 1967).

Here appellant claims prejudice

based on the non-availability of respondent's welfare application
at the time of trial.

Yet her testimony at trial was not

inconsistent with her statement in the welfare application,
as she stated in her affidavit (R. 161).

Further, appellant

never sought to compel production of the document at any
.
time, never moved for a continuance based on the failure to
-15-
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produce the document or even probed the area during crossexamination.

Finally, the form itself in blank was available

at any time to appellant or his counsel to seek answers to
the questions on the form via interrogatories or crossexamination.

This was not attempted either.

No surprise or

prejudice has occurred, no falsehoods were uttered and no
basis for a new trial has been shown.

The trial court's

decision here should be sustained.
CONCLUSION
The trial court considered all the evidence including
expert testimony and the testimony of the parties before
determining that the child's best interests would be served
by awarding custody to Respondent.

This decision is well

founded and should not be overturned by this Court.

The

tender years presumption as applied in this case is not
violative of any person's constitutional rights, is subordinate
to the best interests test, and constitutes an alternate
basis for the custody award.
application.

No error has occurred in its

The trial court acted within its discretion

and denied Appellant's new trial motion.
reversing this decision has been shown.

No basis for
The trial court's

Amended Judgment should be affirmed.

~

DATED this ~day of December, 1980.
Respectfully submitted,
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